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A landmark agreement that transformed U.S.-India relations and rewrote parts of the global nuclear order is still shaping debates about science diplomacy, diplomacy experts and former negotiators said.

Participants in a discussion hosted by the Stimson Center in Washington on Wednesday argued that the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement succeeded in building strategic trust and changing international nuclear governance, even as many of its commercial ambitions failed to materialize.

The event marked the publication of The U.S.-India Nuclear Accord: History, Analysis, and Reflections, a new volume edited by political scientists Šumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree that combines first-person accounts from key negotiators with assessments of the agreement’s long-term consequences.

“The real purpose of it was to bring India strategically into the fold from the U.S. side,” Mistree said, arguing that the agreement’s significance ultimately extended well beyond civilian nuclear energy.

The accord represented one of the most consequential diplomatic breakthroughs of the early 21st century. Under its terms, India agreed to place its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency while retaining control of its military nuclear program.

The agreement also paved the way for an unprecedented waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, allowing international civilian nuclear cooperation with India despite its status outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

"The significance of this accord simply cannot be adequately underscored for the simple reason this was a unique carve out, it was a carve out for one particular country, and this required consequently a significant expenditure of political capital on the part of the Bush administration,” said Ganguly.

In practical terms, the agreement separated civilian and military nuclear activities in a country that had long remained outside key elements of the global nuclear governance system.

For science diplomacy practitioners, the accord offers a striking example of how highly technical questions become diplomatic ones.

Negotiators had to navigate nuclear safeguards, export controls, reactor technology, nonproliferation concerns and international regulatory frameworks while overcoming political opposition in both Washington and New Delhi.

The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement began with a July 2005 framework and was formalized during a March 2006 New Delhi summit between then-U.S. president George W. Bush and India’s then-prime minister Manmohan Singh, with India agreeing to separate its military and civilian reactors. To allow this trade with a non-NPT signatory, Bush signed the Hyde Act in December 2006, and bilateral text negotiations concluded in July 2007.

The deal gained global momentum in September 2008 when the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a historic waiver, lifting a three-decade ban on global nuclear commerce. Following final U.S. congressional approval, the landmark 123 Agreement was officially signed into effect on October 10, 2008, fully integrating India into the global nuclear architecture.

Mistree recalled a pivotal moment during the negotiations in July 2005 when then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice — who wrote the preface for the new book — reportedly told Indian officials to choose someone among their most skeptical ranks to draft language they could accept. “I think we can work with this,” she said, according to Mistree’s account. The exchange, he argued, marked the point when trust began to emerge between the two sides.

Several participants emphasized that trust may have been the agreement’s most enduring legacy.

Daniel Markey, who served at the State Department during the negotiations, described the accord as “an outstanding, perhaps even the outstanding example of how big, bold ideas can, under certain circumstances, be translated into tangible, world-changing policies.”

The deal required years of sustained political effort. Unlike agreements forged in response to an immediate crisis, Markey noted, the initiative reflected a strategic choice by leaders in both countries who were willing to spend considerable political capital despite uncertainty about the outcome.

Yet speakers also acknowledged that the accord fell short of some of its most visible goals.

Many supporters anticipated a significant expansion of civilian nuclear commerce and reactor construction in India. Those expectations largely faded after India’s 2010 nuclear liability law raised concerns among foreign suppliers and investors.

As a result, the agreement’s diplomatic and strategic achievements have often overshadowed its commercial outcomes. That paradox remains relevant for science diplomacy today.

The agreement succeeded in changing institutions, rules and strategic relationships, even where anticipated market outcomes failed to materialize. It demonstrated how technical cooperation can become a vehicle for broader geopolitical realignment and how scientific and regulatory questions can reshape international relationships.

Participants suggested that those lessons may be increasingly important as governments confront contemporary challenges involving artificial intelligence, biotechnology, climate technologies and other fields where scientific expertise and diplomacy are becoming more tightly intertwined.

“This is fundamentally a case where geopolitical interests, commercial interests to an extent, won out over nonproliferation concerns,” said Elizabeth Threlkeld, a senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center.

“And as authors in the book rightly note, there were very strong views on all sides, valid views, informed views. So this was really a debate among experts,” she said. “And rather than being able to make a call on who's right, who's wrong, it's a value judgment in terms of what we're prioritizing in this longer term bet. And I think that was somewhat unique in this moment.”

Editor’s Note: This inaugural edition launches a new monthly series designed to help policymakers, diplomats, scientists and institutional leaders navigate the evolving landscape of science diplomacy and global governance.

Decision Intelligence Briefs provide concise strategic analysis rooted in the legacy of structured decision science. Each monthly briefing maps emerging institutions, governance frameworks, strategic risks and opportunities shaping international scientific cooperation.

The executive summary is open to all readers. The full briefing and downloadable PDF edition are available to paid subscribers.

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Decision Intelligence Briefs | No. 1
The Science Diplomat
June 2026

The global architecture of science diplomacy

Mapping the institutions shaping international scientific cooperation and governance.

Science diplomacy today operates through a distributed network of international organizations, scientific institutions and diplomatic initiatives that shape how scientific knowledge moves into global governance.

Rather than being coordinated by a single authority, international scientific cooperation is managed through overlapping institutions, advisory systems and diplomatic forums. This brief functions as an intellectual map of the institutions and governance mechanisms that are shaping the contemporary architecture of science diplomacy.

Strategic outlook

Three structural trends are reshaping the institutional landscape of science diplomacy.

Scientific institutions are gaining policy influence.

Global scientific bodies increasingly shape diplomatic agendas through expert assessments and technical coordination.

Emerging technologies are expanding the scope of science diplomacy.

Artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and biotechnology are becoming central topics of international governance discussions.

Geopolitical competition is altering patterns of scientific cooperation.

Governments are promoting international research collaboration while simultaneously strengthening research security and technological sovereignty.

These dynamics are transforming science diplomacy from a specialized diplomatic tool into a broader system linking science, security and global governance.

Why this Brief matters

• Science diplomacy increasingly shapes global cooperation on AI, climate change, health, and emerging technologies.

• Influence is distributed across a complex ecosystem of international organizations, scientific institutions, governments, universities, and foundations.

• Understanding that architecture helps decision-makers identify where authority resides, how scientific expertise enters policymaking, and which institutions are shaping the future of international cooperation.

🔓 Unlock the full 8-page Decision Intelligence Brief and download the print-ready PDF edition. Available with a paid subscription or team subscription.

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As U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres warned that El Niño is likely to return in the coming months, both he and officials at the World Meteorological Organization quickly pivoted to a second message: forecasts alone are not enough.

The emphasis on preparedness, anticipatory action and the U.N.’s Early Warnings for All initiative on Tuesday highlighted a broader shift underway inside the international climate system, where increasing attention is focused not only on understanding climate risks but on helping governments act on them.

“The science is clear: El Niño is arriving on our doorstep in the coming months with 90% certainty,” Guterres said in a video message released alongside WMO’s latest El Niño update.

But after describing El Niño as an “urgent climate warning” that would “pour fuel on the fire of a warming world,” Guterres concluded by calling for “early warning systems for all.”

The same theme ran throughout a briefing by WMO Secretary-General Celeste Saulo and the agency’s forecasting experts.

Although the briefing focused on the probability of El Niño conditions developing later this year, Saulo repeatedly emphasized preparedness, risk reduction and anticipatory action.

“Forecasts such as what WMO presents today are a call to action,” she told reporters in Geneva.

The messaging reflects a larger evolution at WMO, which also officially hosts the secretariat for the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

For much of its history, the U.N. weather agency was known primarily for coordinating global weather observations, forecasting standards and scientific cooperation among national meteorological services. Climate monitoring later became a growing part of its portfolio.

Today, WMO increasingly presents its mission in terms of helping countries use scientific information before disasters occur.

That shift is embodied in Early Warnings for All, the U.N.-backed initiative launched by Guterres in 2022 with the goal of ensuring that every person on Earth is protected by life-saving warning systems by the end of 2027.

Helping governments make decisions under conditions of uncertainty

At first glance, the initiative appears to be a meteorological program. In practice, it is a much broader exercise in international cooperation.

WMO co-leads the effort with the U.N. Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, alongside the International Telecommunication Union and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The initiative requires forecasting systems, disaster-risk assessments, telecommunications networks, emergency-management agencies, development finance, public communication systems and political commitment from national governments.

Its four pillars extend well beyond weather prediction: disaster-risk knowledge, monitoring and forecasting, warning dissemination and communication, and preparedness and response capabilities.

In other words, the science becomes useful only when it is embedded in institutions capable of acting on it.

That perspective increasingly shapes how WMO describes its own work.

Recent agency reports focus not only on forecasting advances and observation networks but also on governance, financing, legislation, institutional reform, data-sharing systems and national implementation plans. Success is measured not simply by scientific accuracy but by whether warnings reach vulnerable populations in time to reduce losses and save lives.

The approach reflects a broader trend across international governance.

Scientific institutions are increasingly judged not only by the knowledge they generate but by their ability to help governments make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Similar debates are taking place around artificial intelligence, pandemic preparedness, climate adaptation and other areas where scientific information must be translated into action.

The growing prominence of Early Warnings for All also comes at a moment when parts of the international climate architecture face increasing political and financial pressure.

Since returning to office, the Trump administration has withdrawn the United States from major climate institutions and agreements and reduced support for a range of climate-related programs and scientific initiatives. The U.S. has stepped back from several international bodies that help coordinate climate science, environmental assessments and global risk monitoring.

Against that backdrop, early warning systems occupy a distinctive and more neutral political space within international cooperation. They are framed not only as climate measures but also as tools for public safety, disaster preparedness, development and resilience.

WMO estimates that investments in early warning systems can generate returns many times greater than their cost while sharply reducing disaster-related mortality and economic losses.

For Saulo, the significance of the shift extends beyond meteorology. “Our goal must be to ensure everybody has access to science-based advanced intelligence,” she said.

Later, she described the effort in broader institutional terms.

“This is a cultural change,” Saulo said. “It’s moving from reactive to proactive.”

Issue No. 7 | Monday, June 1, 2026

Good morning,

Welcome to The Science Diplomat Playbook, your Monday morning guide to what’s shaping the week ahead in global science diplomacy.

The lead

Artificial intelligence is moving beyond technology policy and into the institutions that govern work, development and international cooperation.

The shift is on display this week in Geneva, where delegates from governments, employers and workers are gathering for the 114th International Labor Conference. Discussions on artificial intelligence and platform work are expected to feature prominently as the International Labor Organization examines how technological change is reshaping employment, productivity and economic security.

Similar questions are surfacing elsewhere across the multilateral system. The United Nations is convening Behavioral Science Week, while the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia is hosting a regional forum on science and technology diplomacy focused on linking scientific expertise with sustainable development and public policy.

The ILO conference opens with Director-General Gilbert Houngbo’s report, A Moment of Choice: Harnessing Artificial Intelligence for Decent Work, which argues that the effects of AI will depend less on technology itself than on the institutions governing it. The report warns that AI could widen existing inequalities between countries and workers if international cooperation, skills development and labor protections fail to keep pace with technological change.

The report also highlights growing international concern over AI governance, arguing that no country can manage many of the technology’s risks alone and that cooperation will be necessary to prevent widening digital divides and a race to the bottom in labor standards.

The growing role of universities and research networks remains another defining feature of the science diplomacy landscape. Last week’s EUTOPIA Science Diplomacy Global Conference in Brussels emphasized efforts to move beyond research cooperation and engage more directly with international policy discussions.

This week’s agenda reflects how governments increasingly rely on scientific expertise not only to understand global problems but to help govern them.

Inside institutions

World Health Organization — Ebola response enters a critical phase

WHO and Africa CDC are scaling up efforts to contain the Ebola outbreak affecting Congo and Uganda under a joint Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan released last week. Over the weekend, Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus visited Bunia, the capital of Congo’s Ituri Province, as health officials work to expand testing, treatment capacity and community outreach in conflict-affected areas.

On-the-ground plans for the week involve deploying more epidemiologists, clinicians, logisticians and risk communication specialists to conflict-affected zones in Congo. The outbreak, caused by the Bundibugyo strain of Ebola for which no approved vaccine exists, is also becoming a test of international coordination as WHO, Africa CDC and partner organizations seek more funding, support clinical research and push back against border closures that could complicate containment efforts.

United Nations system — Behavioral science enters policy discussions

U.N. Behavioral Science Week brings together officials, researchers and practitioners to examine how behavioral evidence can inform policymaking, public services and international development programs.

Security Council watch

Colombia begins its month-long presidency of the United Nations Security Council with an agenda emphasizing multilateral diplomacy, climate-related security risks, mediation and protection of civilians. Colombian officials also highlighted the implications of emerging technologies, including cybersecurity and AI-generated disinformation.

This week’s schedule includes discussions on threats to international peace and security following reports that a Russian drone carrying explosives entered Romanian airspace, as well as a separate meeting on developments in Lebanon.

The agenda highlights how traditional security questions are increasingly intersecting with broader concerns involving climate resilience, emerging technologies and international cooperation.

The broader U.N. system also turns its attention to leadership and governance questions this week with the election of the president of the 81st General Assembly, the selection of five new non-permanent Security Council members and continuing discussions about the process for choosing the next secretary-general.

Across regions

Africa-Europe innovation cooperation

The IST-Africa 2026 Conference continues this week, bringing together policymakers, researchers, industry representatives and international organizations to examine innovation policy, digital transformation and implementation of the AU-EU Innovation Agenda.

Asia-Pacific open science cooperation and science diplomacy education

UNESCO hosts the latest session of its “Open Science: From the UNESCO Recommendation to Reality in Asia and the Pacific” dialogue series this week, bringing together policymakers, researchers and international organizations to examine implementation of regional approaches to open science, data sharing and scientific cooperation.

Separately, the Asia-Europe Foundation and partner institutions continue preparations following last month’s Science Diplomacy Education Symposium, which examined how universities are training future science diplomacy practitioners.

Science journalism and public trust

Researchers and journalists gather in Austria this week for a discussion hosted by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, the Institute of Science and Technology Austria and the Complexity Science Hub examining the role of science journalism in maintaining accuracy, context and public trust amid increasingly complex policy challenges.

Signals

Artificial intelligence is becoming a multilateral governance issue

International organizations are increasingly treating AI as a question of labor standards, economic development, social protection and international cooperation rather than solely technology policy.

Universities are seeking a larger diplomatic role

Research institutions are becoming more active participants in international policy discussions, particularly around sustainability, security and scientific cooperation.

Science advice is becoming a governance tool

From behavioral science and climate resilience to labor policy and international security, institutions are increasingly seeking ways to integrate scientific expertise into decision-making processes.

On the calendar

June 1–12 — International Labor Conference (Geneva)

Delegates from the ILO’s 187 member nations meet to discuss artificial intelligence, platform work, social dialogue and gender equality in the world of work. → Program

June 1–5 — U.N. Behavioral Science Week (Virtual)

Officials, researchers and practitioners examine how behavioral science can inform public policy and international development. → Program

June 2 — Election of the President of the 81st U.N. General Assembly (New York)
Member nations elect the president of the next General Assembly session and vote on vice presidents and committee officers. The presidency rotates this year to the Asia-Pacific Group. → Details

June 3 — U.N. General Assembly election for Security Council seats (New York)

Member nations elect five new non-permanent members of the Security Council. → Details

June 4 — UNESCO Open Science Dialogue (Virtual)
Policymakers, researchers and international organizations discuss implementation of the UNESCO Recommendation on Open Science across Asia and the Pacific. → Details

June 4 — Security Council briefing on Syria chemical weapons file (New York)

The Council receives an update on the status of Syria’s chemical weapons obligations. → Details

June 5 — UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Hydrological Program Council (Paris)

The Council's 27th session concludes with discussions on international cooperation in water science, water resources management and capacity building. → Details

Closing

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As governments become increasingly preoccupied with economic competition, technological sovereignty and national security, a question that once sat comfortably in the background of international science is moving closer to the center: who safeguards scientific cooperation itself?

That question framed the opening of the EUTOPIA Global Conference on Science Diplomacy on Friday, where university leaders, diplomats and representatives of international organizations gathered to discuss the future of scientific collaboration at a time of growing geopolitical tension.

The conference was built around an observation that has become increasingly common across international institutions. The world’s most pressing challenges — climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and nuclear proliferation among them — are inherently transnational. Yet many of the political systems designed to address them are under strain.

“The challenges confronting humanity have never been more international or even global by nature,” Jan Danckaert, rector of Vrije Universiteit Brussel and chair of EUTOPIA’s Board of Presidents, said in opening remarks.

“Climate change does not recognize visa requirements. The pandemic does not pause at borders. Artificial intelligence shapes economies and also the scientific endeavor without asking permission.”

The concern is not simply that international politics has become more contentious. It is that science itself is increasingly being drawn into geopolitical competition.

The discussion coincided with the European Union approving its first science diplomacy framework, reflecting growing efforts across Europe to formalize scientific cooperation as a component of foreign and research policy.

The conference prospectus notes that scientific cooperation is becoming “politicised, securitized, and instrumentalised for strategic purposes,” raising what organizers describe as a critical question: “who safeguards science as a global common good?”

For UNESCO, that concern has become increasingly central.

“Climate change, pandemics, biodiversity loss, artificial intelligence, water security, biotechnology, emerging technologies do not recognize borders,” said Lodovico Folin Calabi, UNESCO’s representative to the European Union.

“And yet the political and institutional environment in which international scientific cooperation operates has become more complex, more competitive, and increasingly securitized.”

The answer proposed repeatedly during the opening session was that universities themselves may need to assume a larger responsibility for maintaining international scientific ties.

Danckaert argued that universities have been practicing a form of science diplomacy for centuries through the routine work of international collaboration.

“Every international collaboration is, in a kind of way, an act of diplomacy,” he said. “Every co-authored paper is a kind of peace treaty.”

That idea lies at the heart of what conference organizers call the “fourth dimension” of science diplomacy: diplomacy that takes place within scientific cooperation itself rather than through governments alone. The concept reflects a broader shift in the field, where universities, scientific networks and research partnerships are increasingly being viewed not merely as beneficiaries of international cooperation but as institutions that help sustain it.

Aïda Mimouni Chaabane, vice president for international relations at CY Cergy Paris Université, argued that universities are already moving in that direction.

“We are not only supposed to produce science, to educate people,” she said. “We can do more.”

Yet not everyone framed the challenge simply as preserving existing forms of cooperation. For much of the past two decades, science diplomacy was often presented as a way to expand international cooperation. In Brussels, several speakers focused instead on how to sustain cooperation in a more difficult geopolitical environment.

During the conference’s panel on multilateralism, Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, professor of Northern Studies at the Arctic University of Norway, warned against comfortable assumptions about the state of international cooperation.

“If you have implicit incentives in society to follow the flow, sing in the choir, you can easily end up in groupthink, echo chambers, blind spots, and you get surprises,” he said.

“It’s perhaps the role of universities to say that the Emperor is stark naked,” he added. “And I do see a tendency that everybody keeps a polite atmosphere.”

The remark reflected a broader discussion about whether science diplomacy is entering a different phase, one in which maintaining existing channels of cooperation may be as important as creating new ones. Rather than creating entirely new channels of cooperation, some participants suggested its role may increasingly be to preserve existing ones.

“Science diplomacy has always been defined as a builder,” said Luca Polizzi of the United Nations University. “But maybe now science diplomacy is becoming a keeper.”

Others argued that maintaining dialogue itself has become a strategic function.

“Science diplomacy is really not about replacing politics,” said Toto Matshediso of South Africa’s Department of Science, Technology and Innovation. “It’s rather more about preserving the dialogue that has been there over the years, building trust.”

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VIENNA — European Union research ministers formally adopted the bloc’s first science diplomacy framework, completing a multi-year effort to place scientific cooperation, research expertise and technological capacity more firmly within the E.U.’s foreign policy toolkit.

The decision came on Friday at a meeting of the E.U. Competitiveness Council in Brussels, where ministers approved a Council of the European Union recommendation on European science diplomacy. The recommendation is not legally binding, but it establishes a common framework that member nations have committed to implement through their research, diplomatic and international cooperation activities.

The adoption comes as European governments increasingly view scientific cooperation as a strategic asset amid geopolitical tensions, technological competition and growing pressure on international institutions.

“Science diplomacy is more important than ever,” Austrian Minister Eva-Maria Holzleitner told fellow ministers during the Council meeting.

“As pressure on multilateralism, democracy, academic freedom, and rules-based cooperations grows every day, global challenges such as climate change, health threats, and emerging technologies require joint responses based on scientific evidence.”

Holzleitner said science diplomacy helps build trust, maintain dialogue and defend shared values and interests, while calling for what she described as a “genuine Team Europe approach” linking research, innovation, higher education and foreign policy.

The adoption marks the culmination of a process launched by the European Commission and developed through consultations involving roughly 130 scientists, diplomats, policymakers and research leaders from across Europe.

“Science diplomacy is no longer a peripheral endeavor — it is a core strategic imperative,” said Nicodemos Damianou, Cyprus’s deputy minister for research, innovation and digital policy.

“It is through the universal language of science, and a commitment to open yet secured collaboration,” he said, “that the European Union can not only advance its own interests and values, but also forge a more peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world.”

The framework defines science diplomacy as the use of science, scientific evidence and international scientific cooperation to support foreign policy objectives while also using diplomacy to advance research and innovation.

Its adoption reflects a broader shift in European thinking about science diplomacy itself.

Jan-Marco Müller, the European Commission official who led the drafting process, has argued that the field has evolved beyond its traditional emphasis on international cooperation.

“Science diplomacy is also about defending your interests or defending sovereignty,” Müller said in an April interview with The Science Diplomat Podcast. “It is about your values.”

That evolution is visible throughout the framework. According to materials presented on Friday by European Commission policy officer Ágota Dávid, its objectives include defending the Union’s democratic values, strategic interests and technological sovereignty, strengthening Europe’s competitiveness in science and technology, supporting a rules-based international order and contributing to the management of global commons and sustainable development.

At the same time, the Council recommendation stresses that science remains a global public good and that scientific collaboration can build trust and facilitate dialogue with partner countries. It emphasizes open and secure international cooperation in research and innovation while acknowledging growing concerns surrounding emerging technologies, economic security and geopolitical competition. The recommendation also recognizes the need to balance scientific goals with foreign and security policy interests.

The framework emerged from recommendations developed by five expert working groups composed of scientists and diplomats. Each group was co-chaired by representatives of both communities.

One of the central goals, according to Dávid, was to bridge longstanding differences between scientific and diplomatic cultures.

“We always had the impression that we sometimes speak a bit different languages,” she said on Friday at the EUTOPIA Global Conference on Science Diplomacy in Brussels.

Scientists, diplomats, governments and international organizations often approach the same concepts from different perspectives, she said, making communication itself a recurring challenge in science diplomacy.

Müller has argued that bringing those communities together was as important as the final document itself. “Much more important than the end result ... was actually the process,” he said. “It was getting the scientists and diplomats into a room and talk to each other.”

One of the framework’s central themes is balancing scientific openness with growing concerns about security, strategic competition and emerging technologies. Commission presentations describe the challenge as finding “the appropriate balance between openness and restrictedness.”

“How to find this balance between security and openness,” Dávid said. “How to be safe and open at the same time.”

The framework is organized around three broad categories of recommendations.

Strategic measures focus on European priorities, partnerships and global challenges. Operational measures call for stronger science-for-policy and foresight systems, along with greater scientific expertise within diplomatic services. Enabling measures emphasize training, professional development, community building and research on science diplomacy itself.

That emphasis reflects a growing effort to build permanent institutional capacity rather than rely on ad hoc cooperation. Commission plans presented on Friday show implementation will include a European science diplomacy platform, national workshops, mapping exercises, training programs and expanded international dialogues with partners in other regions.

“Diplomats should know more about scientific procedures and processes, but also scientists should be able to speak the language of politics and diplomacy,” Dávid said.

The recommendation also calls for stronger partnerships with countries in the Global South, support for international research capacity-building and the creation of a Mediterranean science diplomacy center. It encourages closer links between diplomatic services, universities, research-performing organizations and European Universities alliances.

The Council also asked the Commission to strengthen monitoring of major scientific and technological developments, including the growing use of artificial intelligence in scientific research, and assess their implications for European policy.

The framework builds on more than a decade of European efforts to define science diplomacy as a field of practice. What distinguishes the new recommendation is its attempt to move beyond concepts and networks toward permanent structures, training programs and policy tools.

Dávid described Friday’s adoption as the beginning of a new phase. “Now the implementation happens,” she said, “which will of course be as important as all these preparatory efforts.”

Heilprin reported from Geneva.

Slides from a presentation on Friday in Brussels at the EUTOPIA Science Diplomat Global Conference by Ágota David, policy officer for the European Commission’s Directorate-General Research and Innovation:

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For years, climate negotiators and carbon market regulators have treated temporary carbon storage with suspicion.

Trees burn. Soils degrade. Wood products decay. Carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere for a few decades does not stay out of the atmosphere permanently. That has made temporary carbon removal one of the most disputed questions in climate accounting and net-zero policy.

Now a new study published in Nature on Wednesday is attempting to redraw the argument.

Researchers from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Peking University, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the University of Maryland and France’s Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l’Environnement said that temporary carbon storage may play a scientifically legitimate role in climate mitigation — not by compensating for carbon dioxide emissions, but by offsetting short-lived climate pollutants such as methane.

The distinction matters because methane behaves very differently from carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. While CO₂ can persist for centuries, methane breaks down far more quickly. According to the study, temporary carbon storage and methane emissions operate on more comparable timescales, making temporary carbon removal potentially suitable for compensating methane emissions in climate accounting systems.

“Our study set out to answer the following question: if temporary CDR cannot offset CO₂, what can it legitimately offset?” said lead author Yue He of Peking University and guest researcher at IIASA.

The paper enters a politically sensitive area of international climate diplomacy.

Methane has become one of the central fault lines in global climate negotiations, particularly for countries with large agricultural sectors and livestock industries. Governments including New Zealand, Brazil and Ireland face persistent methane emissions that remain difficult to eliminate completely without major economic disruption.

At the same time, scrutiny of carbon offsets has intensified in voluntary carbon markets and climate negotiations. Environmental groups and many scientists have criticized offset systems that treat temporary carbon storage as interchangeable with permanent reductions in fossil-fuel emissions.

The new study reinforces that criticism. The authors explicitly conclude that temporary carbon storage cannot fully compensate for carbon dioxide emissions because CO₂ remains in the atmosphere for centuries to millennia.

Instead, the researchers propose what they describe as a more physically grounded framework: matching temporary carbon removal with short-lived climate pollutants that operate over similar time horizons.

From emissions targets to technical disputes

Using climate metrics already embedded in IPCC and U.N. climate reporting systems, the team calculated compensation ratios for methane emissions under different storage durations. Neutralizing the climate impact of one kilogram of methane, the paper found, would require roughly 498 kilograms of CO₂ stored for 20 years or about 101 kilograms stored for 100 years.

The study also revives debate over whether climate accounting systems should treat short-lived and long-lived greenhouse gases separately.

The authors argue that implementing such a framework would likely require a “two-basket” accounting approach distinguishing between gases like methane and long-lived pollutants such as carbon dioxide.

The proposal touches directly on disputes already unfolding inside climate diplomacy and carbon markets.

Over the past decade, climate negotiations increasingly shifted from broad emissions targets toward more technical disputes over accounting rules, measurement systems and the credibility of net-zero claims. Questions once treated as scientific details now shape the economic and political viability of national climate strategies.

The shift is visible across international carbon governance systems themselves. “The increased heterogeneity in carbon pricing instruments (implemented and under development) has increased government interest in improving policy alignment and interoperability,” the World Bank’s 2026 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing report says.

Direct carbon pricing policies now cover 29% of global greenhouse gas emissions, it adds, and the aim is “to support policy coordination on carbon pricing to reduce negative cross-border spillovers and close gaps on transparency, implementation and ambition.”

Temporary carbon removal sits squarely inside that shift.

“Not all greenhouse gases behave the same way, and not all carbon storage needs to be permanent to be genuinely useful,” said IIASA senior research scholar Thomas Gasser, a coauthor of the paper. “Temporary CDR has real climate value, but only when it is matched to the right type of emissions.”

The findings may appeal particularly to countries struggling with methane-heavy agricultural emissions. But they are also likely to trigger renewed debate over whether differentiated accounting systems create scientifically rigorous flexibility or open new pathways for weak climate claims.

The debate is no longer only about how much carbon countries emit. Increasingly, it is also about the accounting systems governing how emissions are measured, compensated and compared.

Those disputes are moving from academic journals into climate negotiations, carbon markets and national policy frameworks.

“A growing number of governments and non-state actors are pledging to be carbon-free — and obviously that’s good news,” U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said during the launch of a 2022 U.N. report on net-zero commitments.

“The problem,” he added, “is that the criteria and benchmarks for these net-zero commitments have varying levels of rigor and loopholes wide enough to drive a diesel truck through.”

Power in global science governance is built into who can operate, measure, access systems, and persist. This series examines those dynamics in five parts, concluding here with position.

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Within the U.N.’s atomic watchdog, the structure of influence is written into its governing rules.

At the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, not all seats on the 35-member Board of Governors are filled through elections. Under the agency’s statute, a portion are designated for countries considered “most advanced in the technology of atomic energy,” alongside members selected through regional representation.

The designation is reviewed periodically, but it reflects long-standing technical capacity rather than short-term diplomatic alignment. Countries with established nuclear industries, regulatory systems, and research programs tend to remain central to the board’s composition through this mechanism, linking accumulated capability to recurring participation. The IAEA Board of Governors includes 13 designated seats and 22 elected by the General Conference.

The structure operates within a sector that continues to expand. More than 400 nuclear power reactors are now operating in over 30 countries, providing close to a tenth of global electricity, according to IAEA data. Dozens more are under construction, and additional countries are exploring nuclear energy as demand rises, including from data centers supporting artificial intelligence.

“Interest in nuclear power continues to expand, across countries and technology companies looking to power data centers for artificial intelligence,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said in March. “Across the world, some 60 countries are now considering introducing nuclear energy.”

Within that expanding landscape, participation in governance continues to reflect earlier investments in capability. A similar pattern appears in scientific coordination bodies, though in less formal ways.

The Global Research Council, which brings together major public research funders, does not issue binding rules. It publishes common principles on peer review, data sharing, and research integrity that are adopted voluntarily. Over time, those principles shape how funding decisions are made across national systems.

For research institutions seeking to collaborate internationally or access external funding, alignment with these standards is often a condition for participation. Evaluation criteria, reporting practices, and transparency requirements tend to converge around frameworks developed by the largest and most established funding agencies.

In large-scale research projects, a comparable dynamic is anchored in physical location.

The ITER reactor under construction in southern France has drawn long-term commitments from a consortium of countries, with development extending across decades. Once operational, it is expected to concentrate expertise, funding, and data in a single site.

Similarly, the Square Kilometre Array, based in South Africa and Australia, establishes those countries as hosts of one of the largest scientific instruments ever built. The location of the arrays, determined well in advance, continues to shape where research activity is centered and how collaboration is organized.

These projects are not easily moved or replicated. Their placement reflects earlier decisions about investment and coordination, and those decisions continue to influence participation over time.

Standards in telecommunications and digital systems produce comparable effects through less visible mechanisms. Within frameworks coordinated by bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union, technical standards define how devices connect to networks and how data is transmitted. Many incorporate patented technologies held by a relatively small number of firms. Once adopted globally, those standards become part of the infrastructure of everyday activity.

Devices connect and data moves without reference to the underlying agreements. At the same time, licensing arrangements tied to those standards continue to channel revenue and influence toward the entities that developed them.

“Standards help us innovate at scale and share innovation worldwide. They are the common understandings we all need to prosper,” said Seizo Onoe, director of the ITU’s Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, in a 2025 report on AI standards.

In emerging areas of governance, similar patterns take shape. The Artemis Accords, which set out principles for civil space exploration, include provisions for establishing “safety zones” to prevent interference between activities. The framework presents these zones as coordination measures, but their application depends on which countries are able to operate on the lunar surface.

Analysts say early missions are likely to influence how those zones are defined in practice, particularly in areas considered valuable for sustained activity, such as regions with access to water ice or consistent sunlight.

“From a space law perspective, sustained human activity on the Moon and beyond depends on shared expectations about safety and responsible behavior,” University of Mississippi School of Law space law professor Michelle Hanlon wrote in The Conversation. “In practice, the countries that show up, operate repeatedly and demonstrate how activity on the lunar surface and in outer space can be carried out over time shape these expectations.”

Similar patterns appear across science diplomacy. Earlier investments in capability, funding, and coordination are reflected in how systems are organized. Participation remains formally open, and new entrants continue to join.

At the same time, the roles available within these systems often reflect conditions established over longer periods, whether through institutional design, infrastructure placement, or standard-setting processes. By the time negotiations take place, those arrangements are already in place.

This concludes the five-part series.

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The Vatican is attempting to shape the moral language surrounding artificial intelligence before the international rules harden.

In Magnifica Humanitas, the first encyclical of his papacy, Pope Leo XIV warned on Monday that artificial intelligence risks concentrating economic and political power, normalizing warfare and undermining human dignity if governments fail to establish stronger international oversight.

The document places the Catholic Church directly inside one of the central geopolitical and scientific disputes now unfolding around artificial intelligence: who gets to shape the rules governing systems increasingly embedded in economies, militaries and public life.

“Artificial intelligence now demands to be disarmed, freed from logics that turn it into an instrument of domination, exclusion and death,” the pope said.

The timing is notable. In early July, the United Nations will convene the first Global Dialogue on AI Governance in Geneva, where diplomats, researchers and technology companies are expected to debate questions ranging from safety standards and interoperability to human rights and military applications. The meeting will also feature the first annual report from the U.N.’s Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, created last year by the General Assembly as part of a broader effort to coordinate international oversight of AI.

The Vatican’s intervention arrives as governments themselves remain divided over how AI should be governed internationally. The European Union has focused heavily on regulation and risk management. The United States increasingly frames AI through strategic competition with China and national security. China emphasizes state sovereignty and centralized control.

Meanwhile, the broader U.N. system is still attempting to build common structures for scientific assessment and international dialogue before diplomatic and regulatory institutions fall further behind the technology. That helps explain why the Vatican’s move matters diplomatically.

Historically, papal encyclicals have often appeared at moments when technological or economic transformations outpaced existing political institutions. Leo XIV explicitly tied Magnifica Humanitas to Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, which addressed labor exploitation and social upheaval during the Industrial Revolution.

Now the Vatican appears to be attempting something similar for the age of artificial intelligence. The encyclical also received unusually direct engagement from parts of the AI industry itself. At the Vatican press conference presenting the encyclical, Anthropic co-founder Christopher Olah sat on the panel a few seats away from Pope Leo XIV and called for stronger outside scrutiny of AI development.

“We need more of the world — religious communities, civil society, scholars, governments — to do what His Holiness has done here: to take this seriously, to look closely, and to push events in a better direction,” Olah said.

“We need informed critics who will tell the labs when we are failing,” he added. “We need moral voices that the incentives cannot bend.”

The appearance of a leading AI researcher alongside the pope underscored how rapidly the debate over artificial intelligence is expanding beyond governments and technology firms alone.

The Vatican’s intervention also immediately drew support from UNESCO, which said the encyclical “resonates deeply” with the agency’s own work on AI ethics and international coordination.

In a statement released after publication of Magnifica Humanitas, UNESCO linked the pope’s warnings about human dignity and concentration of power directly to its 2021 Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, the first global framework of its kind, which now informs policy discussions in more than 80 countries.

“At a time of rapid change and disruption, our position is clear: technology must advance human rights — not erode human dignity,” UNESCO said.

Alongside the July dialogue in Geneva, the U.N. and International Telecommunication Union will host the annual AI for Good summit, while the scientific panel’s first report is expected to help shape future international discussions on AI safety, standards and governance.

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After decades working in one of the world’s longest-running public science programs, Bob McDonald still believes curiosity, evidence and long-form science journalism can cut through polarization and distrust.

The veteran Canadian broadcaster, who has hosted CBC Radio’s Quirks & Quarks since 1992, said science communication plays a critical role in helping the public navigate increasingly complex issues ranging from climate change and artificial intelligence to energy transitions and misinformation.

“I believe that if we have a scientifically literate society, we’ll make good decisions,” McDonald said during an interview on The Science Diplomat Podcast. “And politicians should be following the people.”

McDonald has spent decades translating scientific research for mass audiences through radio, television, books and live events. Quirks & Quarks, now in its 50th year, reaches more than 800,000 listeners weekly across Canada through CBC Radio and podcast platforms.

He is also the author of several popular science books, including Me and My 24 Hours, Canadian Spacewalkers, The Future Is Now and Just Say Yes, which explores how science and technology could help societies address challenges including climate change and sustainability.

Throughout the interview, McDonald repeatedly returned to the importance of scientific literacy and public understanding, even as science increasingly intersects with political conflict and ideological division.

“So that’s where our job comes into play, is to show the difference between good science and somebody’s opinion,” he said. “Good science relies on evidence, on data, on experiments, on peer review, and all of that.”

McDonald said the internet and artificial intelligence have made scientific information more accessible while also making misinformation and conspiracy theories easier to spread.

“With AI now creating images that are very convincing or videos that are convincing, it’s hard to tell the difference between real science and pseudoscience,” he said. “That scares me. That’s our challenge right now.”

At several points during the discussion, McDonald acknowledged the growing overlap between science and politics, particularly around climate change and energy policy.

“That’s when science became political, is when we started thinking about the environment and the impact, our impact on the Earth,” he said.

Still, McDonald insisted that his own role remains focused on explaining science rather than engaging directly in political debate.

“We only do science. We don’t do politics,” he said. “There’s enough. The news department does politics all the time.”

Instead, he described himself primarily as “a translator of science.”

“I can understand scientific language, and I want to translate that to the public and be a bridge between the public and the science,” he said. “That’s what I feel my job is.”

McDonald also emphasized optimism and technological adaptation as central themes in his reporting and public engagement.

“We know how to do it,” he said while discussing climate technologies and energy transitions. “We just need to get on with it.”

He pointed to advances in renewable energy, electric vehicles and hydrogen technologies as evidence that societies can transition away from fossil fuels without abandoning economic growth.

“It’ll make you money, and it’ll save you money to go green and take care of things,” he said. “Keep common sense, make common sense prevail.”

The interview reflected McDonald’s view that science communication helps sustain public trust in evidence and expertise during a period of growing fragmentation in media and politics. “Science to me is curiosity,” he said. “It’s how does the world work?”

Even after interviewing more than 7,000 scientists over the course of his career, McDonald said that sense of wonder has not diminished. “What we don’t know still exceeds what we do know,” he said.

Despite growing political polarization around scientific issues, McDonald said he remains optimistic about humanity’s ability to navigate future challenges.

“I try be optimistic that we’re smart. We’re smart. We’ve been to the Moon and back, for God’s sakes,” he said. “And I have faith in humanity that we’re smart enough that we can engineer our way through this little bottleneck that we are in right now and come to a better future.”

Issue No. 6 | Monday, May 25, 2026

Good morning,

Welcome to The Science Diplomat Playbook, your Monday morning guide to what’s shaping the week ahead in global science diplomacy.

The lead

As major multilateral negotiations stall, universities and research networks are moving more visibly into the space between science and geopolitics.

This week’s science diplomacy agenda shifts toward Brussels, where the EUTOPIA European University Alliance will convene academics, diplomats and policymakers Friday for a conference titled “Science Diplomacy in Turbulent Times,” focused on research security, multilateral cooperation and the growing political role of universities. The meeting is expected to conclude with the signing of the Brussels Statement on the Role of Universities in Science Diplomacy.

The gathering comes days after two major international negotiations ended without resolving some of the central disputes confronting global governance.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference concluded late Friday without a consensus final document for the third consecutive review cycle amid disputes over disarmament, Iran and strategic stability.

In a statement issued after the NPT conference ended, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres expressed disappointment that governments had failed “to seize this critical opportunity to make our world safer.”

WHO member nations concluded the World Health Assembly on Saturday afternoon after approving measures on antimicrobial resistance, health financing and emergency preparedness, while delegates continued debating the future of pandemic cooperation and WHO funding.

Together, the meetings reinforced how difficult consensus-building has become inside institutions designed to manage nuclear governance, global health and scientific cooperation during periods of political tension.

Against that backdrop, universities and research alliances are increasingly positioning themselves not only as participants in international scientific exchange, but as institutions involved more directly in questions of security, technology policy and international coordination.

Questions surrounding infrastructure security and international coordination are also expected to shape discussions this week at the United Nations Security Council, where governments will debate maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, the future of the U.N.-centered international system and continuing instability linked to Iran and regional shipping routes.

Inside institutions

World Health Organization — Post-WHA implementation begins under financial strain

WHO member nations begin implementing decisions adopted during the World Health Assembly on antimicrobial resistance, health financing and emergency preparedness as the organization continues restructuring operations following major budget shortfalls and staff reductions.

International Atomic Energy Agency / NPT regime — Nuclear diplomacy faces another deadlock

Diplomatic fallout continues after the deadlocked Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference, where governments again failed to agree on a final document amid disputes surrounding Iran, disarmament and strategic stability.

European research governance — Open science debates move into funding and sovereignty questions

Meetings connected to the European Open Science Cloud this week are expected to focus on governance structures, long-term funding models and the future of European digital research infrastructure after 2027.

Security Council watch

The United Nations Security Council, meeting under China’s month-long presidency, is focusing this week on institutional legitimacy, multilateral coordination and broader questions surrounding international order.

China’s signature event for the month is Tuesday’s high-level debate on strengthening the U.N.-centered international system, chaired by Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The debate is titled “Upholding the Purposes and Principles of the U.N. Charter and Strengthening the U.N.-centered International System,” with Guterres expected to brief.

Council members are also continuing to monitor developments linked to Iran, maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and the broader regional consequences of instability affecting Gulf shipping routes and nuclear diplomacy.

Additional discussions this week include South Sudan sanctions, North Korea sanctions enforcement, peacekeeper security and continued monitoring of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure.

Across regions

Belgium / EUTOPIA Alliance — Universities position themselves within diplomacy

The EUTOPIA European University Alliance convenes “Science Diplomacy in Turbulent Times” on Friday at Fondation Universitaire in Brussels, bringing together academics, diplomats and policymakers to examine research security, multilateralism and the role of universities in international governance.

Africa-Europe innovation agenda — IST-Africa conference convenes policymakers and researchers

The IST-Africa 2026 Conference begins this week with government officials, researchers and industry representatives discussing digital inclusion, research cooperation and innovation policy linked to the African Union-European Union Innovation Agenda and Horizon Europe Africa Initiative.

International Science Council — Scientific advice and foresight initiatives continue

The International Science Council’s regional foresight sessions for Latin America and the Caribbean continue this week with discussions focused on scientific advice, institutional trust and long-term policy planning.

Signals

Universities are becoming more visible diplomatic actors

Research alliances and academic networks are taking on a more explicit international role as governments look to universities to support coordination, technical cooperation and policy development.

Research governance is moving closer to national strategy

Debates surrounding open science, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and research security are becoming more closely connected to questions of economic resilience, infrastructure protection and national policy.

Multilateral institutions continue operating despite weakening consensus

From WHO and the NPT regime to Security Council diplomacy, international institutions are continuing to function even as political divisions make agreement increasingly difficult.

On the calendar

May 25–29 — IST-Africa 2026 Conference (Virtual)
Ministerial discussions and research sessions focused on AU-EU innovation cooperation, digital inclusion and technology policy. → Program

May 26 — U.N. Security Council debate on multilateralism (New York)
China chairs a high-level debate on strengthening the U.N.-centered international system. → Webcast

May 28–29 — EOSC-A 13th General Assembly (Brussels)
Meetings focused on governance and future funding models for European open science infrastructure. → Program

May 29 — “Science Diplomacy in Turbulent Times” (Brussels)
EUTOPIA conference examining research security, multilateralism and the role of universities in diplomacy. → Program

May 29 — Signing of the Brussels Statement on the Role of Universities in Science Diplomacy (Brussels)
European university leaders and policymakers are expected to endorse a joint statement on academic cooperation and diplomacy. → Background

Closing

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GENEVA (AN) — The World Health Assembly concluded after member nations approved a broad package of resolutions and strategies on antimicrobial resistance, health financing, radiation protection and healthcare workforce recruitment amid growing concern over mounting pressure on the global health system.

During the weeklong gathering split between WHO’s headquarters and the Palais des Nations, delegates adopted more than 20 decisions and 13 resolutions covering issues including tuberculosis, stroke, liver disease, emergency care, precision medicine and antimicrobial resistance.

As WHO’s highest decision-making body, the World Health Assembly meets annually in Geneva to determine the organization’s policies and priorities. It approved what WHO described as a reform of the global health architecture through a member nation-led, WHO-hosted joint process.

Among the most significant measures adopted before the end of the final session on Saturday afternoon was a new WHO strategy on the economics of health for all for 2026–2030, which seeks to place health, equity and well-being more centrally within economic and fiscal policymaking.

The strategy reflects growing concern among health officials that many governments are struggling to sustain health care systems amid rising debt pressures, shrinking aid budgets and competing geopolitical priorities.

Delegates also approved an updated Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance covering 2026–2036.

WHO warned that 1-in-6 common bacterial infections reported in 2023 were resistant to antibiotics and that antimicrobial resistance was associated with an estimated 4.71 million deaths in 2021. Without urgent action, WHO said, antimicrobial resistance could contribute to as many as 39 million deaths by 2050.

Member nations additionally approved the first World Health Assembly resolution specifically addressing radiation and health, covering both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation exposure. The measure calls for stronger monitoring systems, workforce training and integration of radiation risk management into broader public-health programs.

Countries also agreed to amend the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel for the first time since its adoption in 2010.

The revisions expand provisions covering internationally recruited care workers and seek to strengthen ethical standards governing health-worker migration during emergencies.

The assembly also unfolded amid widening geopolitical tensions and mounting financial pressure on international health institutions. Delegates spent part of the week debating measures linked to conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran and Ukraine while WHO itself continued restructuring after major funding losses and staff reductions.

WHO told member nations this week that more than 2,500 staff separations had already occurred worldwide as the organization restructures operations following severe budget shortfalls.

In his closing remarks, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus emphasized that the resolutions adopted during the assembly would matter only if they translated into practical improvements in health care delivery.

“Every resolution you adopt, every agreement you reach, only has value when it changes what happens in a clinic, in a community, or in a household,” Tedros said. “When a health worker has what they need to do their job; when a child is vaccinated; when a mother survives childbirth; when an outbreak is contained before it spreads.”

He said implementing the measures would require “political commitment, sustained financing, and continued cooperation between member states, partners and communities.”

The assembly unfolded amid ongoing concern over emergency outbreaks, including Ebola in Central Africa.

On Friday, U.N. humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher announced that up to $60 million would be released from the Central Emergency Response Fund to accelerate the response to the Ebola outbreak in Congo and neighboring countries.

Momodou Mbenga, first secretary at Ghana’s U.N. mission in Geneva, said this year’s gathering felt “normal” to some extent but also under pressure from simultaneous health emergencies and financial constraints.

“There’s a sense of urgency to have a reform,” Mbenga said. “This is a bit different right now because we do feel like we are dealing with real health emergencies in the wake of a bad financial crisis.”

Mbenga said WHO was increasingly being forced to ration limited resources while trying to respond to multiple crises at once. “The WHO is trying to do more with less,” he said. “The resources are not growing, so they are now rationing.”

He added that the organization’s financial difficulties now appear more severe than during previous assemblies. “I think the crisis is getting worse and worse,” Mbenga said. “Now with the financial one, the WHO doesn’t have much to execute most of its operations and that has affected most of these programs.”

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A major United Nations conference reviewing the global nuclear non-proliferation treaty ended without agreement after weeks of negotiations exposed widening divisions over Iran, nuclear disarmament and the growing risk of a renewed arms race.

The outcome on late Friday marked the third consecutive failure of a five-year review conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone international agreement intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament and support peaceful nuclear energy cooperation.

Vietnam’s U.N. ambassador, Do Hung Viet, who served as conference president, said delegates had engaged in “very honest reflection on the current situation” but ultimately could not bridge differences in an increasingly tense geopolitical environment.

“I am disappointed that the review conference was unable to reach consensus on an outcome document and really seize this critical opportunity to make our world a safer place,” Viet told reporters after the conference concluded.

The final breakdown centered publicly on language concerning Iran’s nuclear program, though diplomats indicated broader disagreements over disarmament obligations, nuclear deterrence and regional conflicts had accumulated throughout the month-long negotiations.

A revised draft outcome document included a disputed paragraph stating that “Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” Iran opposed the language, while the United States insisted it remain.

Viet declined to formally blame any single country. “No one blocked consensus because I understood that there was no consensus and I decided not to put the draft outcome document for a decision,” he said.

Still, he acknowledged that the Iran paragraph was “a very important reason” the conference failed.

The conference unfolded amid worsening global nuclear tensions. Russia’s war in Ukraine, growing rivalry among major powers, modernization of nuclear arsenals, concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and the erosion of arms-control agreements have all heightened fears of a new period of nuclear competition.

Beyond geopolitics, the failure underscored growing strain on the international technical and verification architecture that has underpinned nuclear governance since the Cold War.

“And in the meantime, a nuclear arms race is, I guess, in the horizon,” Viet said. “We are seeing the modernization of nuclear arsenals, we are seeing the quantitative increase in some nuclear arsenals as well.”

The United States sharply criticized Iran during the closing session, calling Tehran “a prolific treaty violator” that had “succeeded in holding treaty members hostage.”

Iran responded by accusing the United States and Israel of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities and abusing the conference process to legitimize military strikes.

The diplomatic deadlock also reflected broader frustration among non-nuclear states over what many see as the failure of nuclear powers to fulfill long-standing disarmament commitments under Article VI of the treaty.

Izumi Nakamitsu, the U.N. high representative for disarmament affairs, warned that confidence in the treaty regime is eroding.

“Non-roliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin,” she said. “It is simply wrong for nuclear weapon states to assume that nonproliferation obligations will be just adhered to without nuclear weapon states’ commitment and implementation of disarmament commitment under Article VI.”

She said governments must “take this third time failure very seriously if they want to preserve this regime.“

The negotiations illustrated how much the nuclear debate has shifted since earlier review conferences. Earlier drafts contained stronger language on arsenal modernization, nuclear testing, “no first use” policies and reductions in nuclear risk, but many of those provisions were diluted or removed in later revisions as consensus proved impossible.

References to North Korea’s nuclear program and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine were also removed from later drafts.

At the same time, disagreements surfaced over newer strategic concerns, including artificial intelligence, military automation and the relationship between conventional and nuclear systems.

The failure also highlighted growing divisions between nuclear-armed nations and a broader coalition of countries pushing for faster progress toward abolition through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which several nuclear powers continue to oppose.

Civil society groups warned that the inability to reach agreement reflected a broader weakening of the international nuclear order.

“The disappointing outcome to this NPT meeting, at a time when nuclear threats are being made and tensions are sky high, has to be a wakeup call for everyone,” Melissa Parke, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, said after the meeting. “The world overwhelmingly does not want nuclear weapons.”

Despite the failure to agree on a final document, officials stressed that the treaty itself remains legally binding and continues to underpin the global non-proliferation system. The next review cycle begins in 2028, with the next full review conference scheduled for 2031 in New York.

Season 1, Episode 5 — Bob McDonald on curiosity, climate, and communicating science

Science enters public life through communication long before it reaches governments or policy debates. In this conversation, Bob McDonald, chief science correspondent for the CBC and longtime host of Quirks and Quarks, reflects on more than five decades spent translating scientific discovery for public audiences.

Drawing on a career shaped by the Apollo era, environmental reporting, and rapid technological change, McDonald discusses how public understanding of science has evolved alongside growing political polarization, climate misinformation, and distrust in expertise. He argues that science communication is less about simplifying information than about helping people connect scientific evidence to everyday life.

The conversation explores climate change, pseudoscience, artificial intelligence, energy transitions, scientific literacy, and the role of curiosity in shaping how societies respond to uncertainty and technological change. McDonald also reflects on optimism, public engagement, and why science journalism still depends on trust.

Themes covered:

• Science communication and public trust

• Climate change and misinformation

• Artificial intelligence and technological change

• Scientific literacy and public understanding

• Communicating uncertainty and evidence

• Space exploration, curiosity, and optimism

Recorded on May 5, 2026.

Co-hosted by Amna Habiba, Bupe Chikumbi, and John Heilprin.

Power in global science governance is built into who can operate, measure, access systems, and persist. This series examines those dynamics in five parts, continuing here with time.

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In 1958, climatologist Charles David Keeling began measuring carbon dioxide in the atmosphere using an experimental manometer at Mauna Loa, a site selected for its clean and stable air. Trade winds sweeping across the Pacific reduced local contamination, allowing readings that could be compared consistently over time.

The work was part of a broader effort to understand atmospheric chemistry and, over time, the measurements became something more broadly durable and useful, even for diplomacy.

Today, carbon dioxide concentrations are tracked through long-term observation systems coordinated under the World Meteorological Organization’s Global Atmosphere Watch program. Monitoring stations operate across a range of environments, but the record at Mauna Loa remains one of the longest continuous datasets available.

Carbon dioxide levels there were about 385 parts per million in 2009, when governments meeting in Copenhagen coalesced around a goal of limiting global warming to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Now, they are tracking closer to 430 ppm.

The change is significant, but so is the continuity of the record that captures it. Because the measurements have been maintained without interruption, they allow scientists to distinguish long-term trends from short-term variation. That distinction underpins much of the analysis used in climate assessments.

Countries entering the system today can deploy sensors and contribute new data. They cannot recreate a continuous record that began decades earlier under different atmospheric conditions. The value of the dataset depends on how long it has been maintained.

“Without long-term observations it would not be possible to confirm that the Earth has warmed significantly over the past century,” WMO’s then-deputy secretary-general Elena Manaenkova said in 2019, when recognition certificates were handed to stations that have observed weather for more than a century.

Records like these are used repeatedly in scientific reports and policy discussions. Their role comes from continued use rather than formal designation. Over time, the measurements became a long-term record used to track change.

Time operates differently in systems that manage innovation. Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, a filing establishes a “priority date.” That date marks when an invention is formally recognized and sets the sequence for what follows. Applicants then have up to 30 months to decide where to seek protection, refine the technology, and secure financing.

During that period, others working in the same area can continue research, but moving toward commercial use carries legal risk. The filing does not stop competing work. It sets the order in which that work can move forward.

“In this world of shortened innovation and business cycles, WIPO will work hard to ensure that our global IP services keeps pace with the changing expectations of our customers,” WIPO Director General Daren Tang said in March, when the agency reported that international patent filings rose 0.7% in 2025 to 275,900 applications.

The effect is often most visible in industries where development and deployment move quickly. Differences in timing can affect which products reach the market first and under what conditions.

Long-term research programs show a similar pattern in a different setting. Space missions are often planned and executed over decades. Designing, funding, and launching a major mission requires sustained coordination across changes in leadership, policy priorities, and budgets. Decisions made early in the process shape the work that follows.

Participation in these programs is formally open. In practice, roles differ over time. Countries able to maintain funding and technical continuity tend to lead mission design and set research priorities. Others contribute instruments, data analysis, or supporting work within frameworks established earlier.

“This is not a sprint, this is a marathon,” Thomas Zurbuchen, who led NASA’s science mission directorate from 2016 to 2022, wrote about competition in space exploration. “Having run several marathons myself, I know from experience that consistency and focus are the most vital ingredients for victory.”

The differences in duration show up in how work is organized and decisions are made. Long-running climate records provide the basis for scientific assessments. Patent filings establish the sequence in which technologies move toward market. Space missions reflect commitments made many years before launch.

These patterns emerge from how long the systems are maintained and how consistently they are funded. Countries and institutions that sustain programs over longer periods often define the records, timelines, and project structures that others work within. Those entering later contribute to ongoing efforts but do so against baselines and schedules that are already in place.

By the time negotiations take place, those conditions have already been set.

Part 5 examines how these advantages, once established through capacity, measurement, access, and time, become embedded in institutions and continue to shape outcomes.

Issue No. 5 | Monday, May 18, 2026

Good morning,

Welcome to The Science Diplomat Playbook, your Monday morning guide to what’s shaping the week ahead in global science diplomacy.

The lead

The World Health Assembly opens this week under the shadow of Ebola and strain on global health cooperation.

The World Health Organization declared the Ebola outbreak affecting Congo and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on Sunday, elevating the crisis just as health ministers, diplomats and scientific advisers arrive in Geneva for the 79th World Health Assembly, WHO’s governing body. The designation is the organization’s highest level of global alarm short of a pandemic emergency.

The outbreak, caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain of Ebola, has added urgency to an assembly already expected to focus heavily on pandemic preparedness, financing and implementation of last year’s Pandemic Agreement. Unlike the more common Zaire strain, there are no approved vaccines or targeted treatments for the Bundibugyo variant, increasing pressure on governments, researchers and international health agencies to coordinate surveillance, diagnostics and research efforts under difficult conditions.

The emergency also arrives at an awkward moment for global health governance. WHO member nations failed to finalize key elements of the Pandemic Agreement’s Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) framework after disputes over intellectual property, technology transfer and access to medical countermeasures delayed consensus. The Pandemic Agreement itself was adopted at last year’s World Health Assembly and was presented as a major achievement for multilateral health diplomacy after the COVID-19 pandemic. But the treaty’s operational framework still depends on a separate agreement governing how countries share biological samples, pathogen data, vaccines and other medical countermeasures during outbreaks. WHO member nations are now expected to extend those negotiations into 2027 as technical and political disagreements remain unresolved.

Those tensions are likely to shape discussions throughout the assembly. Developing countries continue to push for stronger guarantees that scientific data and pathogen samples shared during outbreaks will lead to equitable access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics. Wealthier countries and pharmaceutical interests remain cautious about provisions affecting intellectual property, manufacturing and mandatory benefit-sharing obligations.

WHO has already released emergency funding and advised governments against border closures or trade restrictions, warning that such measures can push outbreaks into less visible and harder-to-monitor channels. At the same time, the organization is expected to convene an International Health Regulations emergency committee to refine recommendations as cases spread from remote areas into major urban centers including Kampala and Kinshasa.

The outbreak is also triggering parallel layers of regional and international coordination. Africa CDC said on Sunday it is considering whether to declare a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security, a mechanism reserved for cross-border threats affecting multiple African Union member nations. The agency has already convened representatives from affected countries, donor governments, U.N. agencies, pharmaceutical companies and humanitarian organizations to coordinate surveillance, laboratory systems, logistics and cross-border response efforts.

Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya also announced he would cut short his participation at the World Health Assembly in Geneva to return to affected countries, underscoring how outbreak governance operates simultaneously through national, regional and global institutions.

The assembly also opens under broader political strain surrounding the future of international health cooperation itself. The United States and Argentina have withdrawn from WHO even as recent outbreaks continue to demonstrate the dependence of disease surveillance, diagnostics and emergency coordination on cross-border scientific cooperation.

The outbreak, stalled pandemic negotiations and the withdrawals of the United States and Argentina from WHO expose new strains on the institutions that underpin global health cooperation. As health ministers gather in Geneva this week, the central question is not only how to contain the Ebola outbreak, but whether the international systems designed to coordinate surveillance, research and emergency response can function effectively during a major cross-border health crisis.

Inside institutions

World Health Organization — WHA79 opens amid outbreak diplomacy

Health ministers, diplomats and scientific advisers from 194 member nations gather in Geneva this week as WHO members confront unresolved negotiations over the Pandemic Agreement’s pathogen-sharing framework alongside mounting political strain surrounding the future of international health cooperation.

Africa CDC — Continental emergency coordination intensifies

Africa CDC is weighing whether to declare a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security as Ebola spreads across borders in Central and East Africa. The agency has activated regional coordination mechanisms involving governments, U.N. agencies, donors and pharmaceutical companies while emphasizing African-led preparedness and response architecture.

United Nations system — AI governance moves toward operational coordination

Preparatory consultations continue this week for the inaugural U.N. Global Dialogue on AI Governance as governments and stakeholders move from broad principles toward questions involving implementation, coordination and institutional oversight.

Peace Research Institute Oslo — European resilience debates widen

PRIO’s European Security Week examines how shifting alliances, emerging technologies and infrastructure vulnerabilities are reshaping European security governance and strategic resilience.

Scientific institutions — Universities expand diplomacy training networks

Academic institutions and international education networks continue building formal science diplomacy training initiatives focused on preparing future diplomatic and governance leaders.

Security Council watch

The United Nations Security Council, meeting under China’s month-long presidency, is focusing this week on institutional legitimacy, protection of civilians and broader questions surrounding international order and multilateral coordination.

The agenda includes a briefing on Ukraine following intensified Russian attacks on civilian and critical infrastructure, the Council’s annual debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and discussions on Gaza, Libya and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz.

The schedule reflects how humanitarian coordination, infrastructure protection and institutional resilience are increasingly intersecting across multiple U.N. processes.

Across regions

Switzerland / European Union — Water diplomacy gains strategic attention

A Swiss science briefing in Brussels this week examines water security as both a scientific and geopolitical issue, reflecting growing concern over climate pressures, resource governance and strategic infrastructure resilience.

Asia-Europe science diplomacy initiatives expand

The Science Diplomacy Education Symposium brings together educators, researchers and academic leaders to examine how universities across Asia and Europe are adapting science diplomacy training to shifting geopolitical and technological conditions.

Latin America / International Science Council — Foresight and scientific advice gain institutional focus

Virtual foresight sessions organized by the International Science Council’s regional focal point for Latin America and the Caribbean are bringing together policymakers, diplomats and researchers to examine how scientific advice, strategic foresight and evidence-based governance can be integrated more directly into public institutions.

Signals

Global health governance is being tested under real-world pressure

The Ebola emergency and postponed Pandemic Agreement negotiations are exposing unresolved tensions surrounding equity, technology transfer and institutional trust.

Scientific cooperation remains resilient despite political fragmentation

Even as governments challenge multilateral institutions politically, outbreak response and scientific coordination continue to depend heavily on international cooperation frameworks.

Strategic resilience is becoming a central diplomatic concern

From health systems and water security to AI governance and infrastructure protection, institutions are increasingly focused on resilience across interconnected systems.

On the calendar

May 18–23 — 79th World Health Assembly (Geneva)
Health ministers and diplomats convene as WHO member nations confront outbreak response, pandemic governance and health financing. → Program

Side events and parallel discussions are also expected to focus on climate-related health risks, artificial intelligence, disability equity and “One Health” approaches linking human, animal and environmental health. → Details

May 19 — Swiss Science Briefing: “Eyes on Water” (Brussels)
Swiss and European institutions examine water as a strategic scientific and geopolitical resource. → Details

May 18–22 — PRIO European Security Week (Online)
Series examining European resilience, technological change and shifting security dynamics. → Program

May 18–22 — Canada-Singapore AI + Quantum Collaboration Mission (Singapore)
Government officials and industry leaders convene alongside Asia Tech x Singapore to expand bilateral cooperation on artificial intelligence and quantum technologies. → Details

May 20 — Science Diplomacy Education Symposium (Online)
Asia-Europe forum examining how universities are training future science diplomacy practitioners and policy leaders. → Details

May 18–24 — WHO Ebola emergency coordination efforts
WHO and international partners continue response coordination following the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern linked to the Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak. → Background

Closing

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Two recent episodes have highlighted a widening divide in global artificial intelligence governance.

In San Francisco, Anthropic invited Christian theologians, priests and philosophers to discuss how its Claude chatbot should respond to grief, self-harm and questions surrounding its own possible “demise.” The closed-door discussions reflected the company’s growing focus on embedding moral reasoning into frontier AI systems.

In South Africa, meanwhile, the government withdrew its first national AI policy after journalists discovered that several academic citations in the document had been fabricated, apparently through the unverified use of generative AI.

The episodes reveal a growing imbalance in AI governance. While leading technology companies are increasingly shaping the ethical architecture of artificial intelligence, many governments are still struggling to establish the institutional credibility needed to regulate the technology itself.

The contrast also points to a broader geopolitical shift: AI governance is no longer only about regulation or innovation. It is increasingly a question of power, legitimacy and knowledge authority.

Speaking at the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi on Tuesday, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called for “developing African capacity in artificial intelligence so that AI is shaped by African data, African languages, African researchers and African leadership.”

Anthropic’s theological turn

Anthropic has positioned itself as one of the safety-focused companies developing frontier AI systems. Its Claude models operate under a detailed internal “constitution” designed to guide the chatbot’s behavior around honesty, harm reduction and public safety.

The March meeting in San Francisco pushed those discussions further into questions traditionally associated with philosophy and religion. According to reports, participants discussed how Claude should respond to emotionally charged situations including grief and existential distress.

The company’s interest in embedding ethical behavior into its systems reflects a growing recognition inside the AI industry that large language models increasingly shape not only information flows, but also emotional interaction, reasoning and public discourse.

That shift is beginning to blur the boundary between technical design and normative governance.

Anthropic’s leadership has also faced political pressure over safeguards embedded in its systems that some U.S. defense officials viewed as limiting military applications. The dispute underscored how rapidly AI model design is becoming entangled with state priorities, security debates and geopolitical competition.

The values encoded into frontier models are increasingly geopolitical.

South Africa’s credibility crisis

If Anthropic’s debate centered on moral authority, South Africa’s crisis exposed a more basic challenge: epistemic authority.

The country’s draft national AI policy was withdrawn less than three weeks after publication when journalists identified fabricated academic citations in the document. Some journals did not exist. Others were real publications containing no such articles.

Communications and Digital Technologies Minister Solly Malatsi described the lapse as “unacceptable” and acknowledged that generative AI had likely been used without proper verification.

“This failure is not a mere technical issue but has compromised the integrity and credibility of the draft policy. As such, I am withdrawing the Draft National Artificial intelligence Policy,” he said in late April. “The most plausible explanation is that AI-generated citations were included without proper verification. This should not have happened.”

The draft policy had proposed establishing a National AI Commission, an Ethics Board and a regulatory authority intended to position South Africa as a continental leader in AI governance.

Instead, the episode quickly became a cautionary example of the risks governments face when institutional verification systems fail.

Writing in The Conversation, University of the Witwatersrand cyber law scholar Nomalanga Mashinini argued that the problem went beyond embarrassment.

“The hallucinated citations reveal two specific failures. Epistemic integrity (the assurance that research has been conducted through reliable, ethical and repeatable methods that any reader could verify) was absent,” she wrote. “So was information integrity (the public’s reasonable expectation that information from an authoritative source can be trusted).”

The incident also highlighted a structural asymmetry increasingly visible across global AI governance.

While major AI laboratories possess vast technical resources, interpretability teams and dedicated safety divisions, many governments, particularly in the Global South, are still building the expertise and institutional capacity needed to evaluate AI systems credibly.

That imbalance is beginning to shape who defines the rules, values and assumptions embedded in emerging AI governance frameworks.

A new science diplomacy challenge

Artificial intelligence governance increasingly resembles earlier global governance disputes surrounding nuclear technologies, biotechnology and climate systems. It involves standards-setting, strategic competition and transnational coordination.

But AI introduces a more intimate governance challenge because the systems shape communication, reasoning and access to information.

These systems increasingly mediate communication, education, emotional support and access to information. Questions about AI governance therefore extend beyond infrastructure and regulation into culture, ethics and public trust. That challenge is increasingly visible in international diplomacy.

Similar debates emerged at a Commonwealth anti-corruption conference in Cameroon, where officials discussed the use of AI tools in governance and public oversight while also warning about risks surrounding accountability and institutional integrity.

The parallel developments suggest AI governance is evolving unevenly across regions and institutions. In some parts of the world, the debate centers on aligning frontier systems with moral philosophy and human values. In others, the more immediate challenge is establishing reliable mechanisms for verification, transparency and oversight.

Africa has increasingly sought to position itself within those debates rather than outside them. Frameworks such as the African Union’s continental AI strategy and the Smart Africa initiative emphasize local governance capacity, digital sovereignty and regional coordination.

Malatsi said South Africa’s recent experience “proves why vigilant human oversight over the use of artificial intelligence is critical. It’s a lesson we take with humility. I want to reassure the country that we are treating this matter with the gravity it deserves. There will be consequence management for those responsible for drafting and quality assurance.”

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Power in global science governance is built into who can operate, measure, access systems, and persist. This series examines those dynamics in five parts, continuing here with access.

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In the windowless conference rooms where the International Seabed Authority regularly meets in Kingston, Jamaica, delegates return repeatedly to a principle embedded in the law of the sea: the “common heritage of mankind.”

The seabed beyond national jurisdiction, known as the Area, is formally held in trust for all. In practice, reaching that part of the ocean depends on capabilities that are not widely shared.

Operating more than 200 nautical miles from shore requires specialized research vessels, remotely operated or crewed submersibles, and mapping systems designed to function under extreme pressure and distance. Those systems are expensive and technically demanding, concentrated among a limited number of countries and commercial operators.

The regulatory system reflects that reality. The ISA does not conduct exploration itself; it issues contracts that allow nations and their partners to operate in designated areas. Participation depends on both technical capacity and formal approval.

Its structure became more visible in 2021, when the tiny island nation of Nauru invoked a provision known as the “two-year rule.” The mechanism requires the ISA to move toward finalizing regulations for commercial seabed mining within a set timeframe once triggered by a sponsoring nation.

The rule had been in place for years, but its use accelerated negotiations that had been moving slowly. Nauru’s position was tied to a corporate partner already engaged in exploration and equipped with the technology to operate at depth. The procedural step and the underlying capability worked together, allowing a small country to push a larger process forward.

“This process will allow Nauru, and other developing countries to participate in a new industry, accessing valuable resources in light of a historical context that far too often deprived developing countries from reaping the benefits,” Nauru President Lionel Aingimea told the U.N. General Assembly in September 2021.

“Accessing these polymetallic nodule resources is critical to building the clean energy transition we need and towards a circular economy,” he said. “These polymetallic nodules are needed to transform big and small countries’ energy systems and support our fight against the climate crisis.”

A similar pattern appears in the infrastructure that carries global data.

What is often described as “the cloud” depends on a network of subsea fiber-optic cables that carry most international data traffic, including financial transactions, scientific data, and government communications. The cables run along fixed routes across the ocean floor and connect through specific landing points along coastlines.

Digital lifelines and divides

A relatively small group of companies and consortia build and maintain these systems. Their placement reflects long-term investment decisions, commercial demand, and, increasingly, national security considerations.

How those networks are arranged affects how countries take part in the global system. Nations connected through multiple high-capacity cables, with backup routes and several landing points, operate under different conditions than those relying on a single connection or routing data through another country. Differences in speed, capacity, and reliability shape how information moves and how systems respond to outages or disruption.

Landing stations, often low-profile facilities along coastlines, serve as key entry and exit points. Their location and control influence how networks are expanded and maintained.

Recent disputes over cable routes and equipment suppliers have highlighted the strategic importance of these systems. At the same time, new projects are beginning to include environmental sensors in cable design, allowing operators to collect data on seismic activity and ocean conditions as part of routine operations.

“Historically, these waterways served as arteries of global commerce. Today, they have evolved into digital lifelines, carrying trillions of bytes that power financial markets, artificial intelligence platforms and sovereign cloud services,” legal and regulatory expert Hamza Alakalik wrote in The Jordan Times in April.

Scientific findings can be shared widely once produced. But collecting that information, whether from the deep ocean or through global networks, depends on equipment and infrastructure that are expensive and unevenly distributed.

Similar dynamics appear in other systems. In global health, surveillance systems and sequencing capacity influence where outbreaks are first identified and how quickly they are analyzed. In finance, payment and clearing systems determine how money moves across borders. In technology, technical standards shape which systems can connect and which are left out.

“Today’s digital divides are increasingly about quality and affordability,” Doreen Bogdan-Martin, secretary-general of the International Telecommunication Union, said in its 2025 Year in Review.

These systems are rarely framed in political terms. They appear as equipment requirements, network design, or regulatory procedure. Their effects are visible in practice. Cable routes, landing points, and payment systems are built over years and are costly to duplicate. Traffic and investment follow existing lines, reinforcing their use.

As a result, participation varies even among countries that are formally part of the same agreements. Some operate directly within these systems, while others rely on external connections or intermediaries. By the time negotiations take place, those differences are already in place.

Part 4 examines how these dynamics extend over time and how the ability to sustain presence, investment, and participation across decades creates its own form of structural advantage.

Issue No. 4 | Monday, May 11, 2026

Good morning,

Welcome to The Science Diplomat Playbook, your Monday morning guide to what’s shaping the week ahead in global science diplomacy.

The lead

Technologically interconnected systems are becoming harder for governments and institutions to ignore.

A series of meetings this week across Geneva, Cambridge and Belgrade reflects a broader shift underway in global governance: emerging technologies are no longer treated primarily as matters of innovation policy, but increasingly as issues tied to security, infrastructure resilience, public trust and geopolitical stability.

That transition is visible across multiple institutions simultaneously. Preparatory discussions ahead of the 79th World Health Assembly continue this week in Geneva after WHO member states failed to finalize key elements of the Pandemic Agreement last week. Disputes over intellectual property, technology transfer and governance of pathogen-sharing systems delayed agreement on the treaty’s Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing framework, exposing continuing tensions between developed and developing countries.

At the same time, follow-up discussions from last week’s OSCE conference on anticipatory governance are expected to focus on long-term risks linked to artificial intelligence and quantum technologies, particularly how governments assess emerging threats before governance mechanisms are fully developed.

Questions about whether governance systems can keep pace are also running through discussions surrounding digital infrastructure and cyber stability. Geneva Cyber Week follow-up meetings, preparations for World Telecommunication and Information Society Day on May 17 and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s CyberCon26 conference in Vienna are reinforcing concerns that systems underpinning communications, finance, healthcare and nuclear infrastructure have become deeply interdependent without corresponding advances in coordination or oversight.

This week’s agenda also highlights the expanding diplomatic role of universities and research institutions. On Wednesday, policymakers, diplomats and researchers will gather in Belgrade for the conference “When Science Meets Diplomacy,” focused on regional cooperation in Central and Southeastern Europe. Elsewhere, universities and academic networks are increasingly acting not only as participants in scientific cooperation, but as institutional forces within diplomatic channels.

Together, these developments point toward a deeper transformation in science diplomacy. Scientific expertise is becoming embedded more directly within negotiations over infrastructure, security, trade, public health and strategic stability. The challenge facing governments is no longer simply whether to cooperate on science and technology, but whether governance systems can adapt quickly enough to manage the political and security consequences that increasingly accompany them.

Inside institutions

World Health Organization — WHA preparations unfold amid outbreak response

WHO’s member nations are entering the final week of preparations for the 79th World Health Assembly as the organization also coordinates an international response to a multi-country hantavirus outbreak linked to maritime travel. The overlap highlights the dual role increasingly expected of global health institutions: managing immediate cross-border health threats while advancing longer-term governance agendas on pandemic preparedness, financing and health security.

United Nations system — Digital governance agenda expands

Preparations for World Telecommunication and Information Society Day are reinforcing broader U.N. efforts to frame digital infrastructure and communications systems as matters of resilience, governance and international stability rather than solely technical coordination.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — Anticipatory governance moves forward

Discussions following last week’s OSCE conference in Geneva continue to examine how participating nations assess emerging risks associated with artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and long-term strategic instability.

World Trade Organization — Institutional reform pressures continue

The WTO continues post-ministerial discussions over institutional reform, budget constraints and unresolved electronic commerce negotiations amid broader pressure on multilateral economic institutions to adapt to technological and geopolitical change.

Security Council watch

China holds the presidency of the United Nations Security Council in May with a program emphasizing institutional legitimacy, protection of civilians and the role of the U.N. system in international security. The Council’s program for the month also includes meetings on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya, Syria, South Sudan and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, alongside continued discussions connected to the North Korea sanctions regime.

The schedule reflects a broader diplomatic environment in which debates over technology, security and institutional legitimacy intersect across multiple U.N. processes.

Across regions

Serbia / Central European Initiative — Science diplomacy and regional cooperation

The “When Science Meets Diplomacy” conference convenes in Belgrade on Wednesday, bringing together regional diplomats, researchers and policymakers to examine how scientific cooperation can support political dialogue and regional stability.

CASEE Conference — Agriculture and life sciences as integration policy

The 16th CASEE Conference opens this week under the theme “Next Stop Europe,” examining how agricultural and life sciences education can contribute to European integration and cross-border cooperation.

Universities and science diplomacy education

Registration continues for the upcoming Science Diplomacy Education Symposium later this month, part of a broader Asia-Europe initiative examining how universities prepare future science diplomacy practitioners and policy leaders.

Signals

Governance systems are struggling to keep pace with technological interdependence

From cyber infrastructure to pandemic preparedness, institutions are confronting risks that increasingly cut across traditional governance boundaries.

Universities are becoming more visible diplomatic actors

Academic institutions are playing a growing role in regional cooperation, policy development and international governance discussions.

Security and technology debates are converging across institutions

Issues once treated separately, ranging from digital infrastructure and AI governance to public health security and strategic stability, are increasingly being addressed within overlapping diplomatic frameworks.

On the calendar

May 11 — “Thinking in the Age of Generative AI” (Cambridge)
CRASSH hosts a roundtable examining the political, ethical and social implications of generative artificial intelligence. → Program

May 11–14 — CASEE Conference (Novi Sad)
Regional conference on agriculture, life sciences education and European integration. → Program

May 11–15 — IAEA CyberCon26 (Vienna)
International conference on computer security in the nuclear sector focused on cyber resilience and evolving digital threats to nuclear infrastructure. → Program

May 12 — U.N. Global Dialogue on AI Governance stakeholder consultation (Virtual)
The third stakeholder consultation for the inaugural U.N. Global Dialogue on AI Governance convenes governments and international stakeholders to discuss the structure, priorities and roadmap for future multilateral cooperation on artificial intelligence. → Details

May 13 — “When Science Meets Diplomacy” conference (Belgrade)
Conference on regional cooperation and science diplomacy in Central and Southeastern Europe. → Details

May 13–15 — WHO PBAC meeting (Geneva)
WHO’s Program, Budget and Administration Committee meets ahead of the World Health Assembly. → Details

May 17 — World Telecommunication and Information Society Day
Annual U.N. observance focused on digital cooperation and communications governance. → Background

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As the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded a two-day conference in Geneva on emerging technologies and security, Swiss officials and senior OSCE leaders used the meeting to advance a broader argument: that international security institutions are falling behind the pace of technological change and must begin incorporating scientific foresight into diplomacy itself.

The conference, titled “Anticipating technologies – for a safe and humane future,” brought together government officials, scientists, diplomats and technology experts at CERN in Geneva to discuss how artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and other advanced technologies are reshaping security, governance and geopolitical competition.

But beyond the formal agenda, the meeting also signaled an effort by Switzerland, as it begins its 2026 OSCE chairpersonship, to reposition technological anticipation as a core function of multilateral security governance. OSCE, the world's largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization, brings together 57 participating nations across Europe, North America, and Asia.

Opening the conference, the Swiss foreign minister and OSCE chairman-in-office, Ignazio Cassis, framed emerging technologies not simply as technical developments but as forces reshaping the foundations of international order.

“Technology is no longer just a tool,” Cassis said. “It is becoming an actor.”

He argued that the principal danger was no longer only technological surprise but the growing gap between rapidly evolving technologies and the institutions responsible for governing them.

“Today, we often decide before we fully understand,” Cassis said. “The strategic risk is no longer only technological surprise. It is political lag.”

The remarks reflected a broader shift underway in international governance discussions, where artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and quantum technologies are increasingly being treated not only as innovation issues but also as strategic and security concerns.

A recurring theme during the discussions was that existing governance structures were struggling to keep pace with technological acceleration.

OSCE Secretary General Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu said technology is evolving faster than the frameworks designed to manage them. “There is a widening gap today: between what technology can do, and how we manage it,” he said.

Sinirlioğlu argued that dialogue itself had become a source of stability in a fragmented geopolitical climate and suggested OSCE’s traditional role in confidence-building could be adapted to technological risks.

The organization has historically focused on transparency and risk reduction measures developed during the Cold War, including the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, a landmark Cold War agreement aimed at reducing East-West tensions, and the Vienna Document, a 1990 agreement designed to build trust and military transparency. Officials at the conference repeatedly linked those earlier confidence-building mechanisms to current discussions about AI governance, cyber security and technological risk management.

“There is a thread connecting all these measures: they promote transparency, communication, and co-operation,” Sinirlioğlu said. “Technological change creates new risks. And those risks must be managed.”

The conference suggested that Switzerland is attempting to extend that logic into what officials increasingly describe as ‘anticipatory governance,’ using scientific expertise and foresight to identify emerging risks before they escalate into crises.

Swiss officials tied the initiative directly to work that Bern pursued during its recent term on the United Nations Security Council. In October 2024, under the Swiss presidency, the Security Council formally recognized for the first time that scientific developments can directly affect international peace and security.

The OSCE conference appeared designed in part to carry that agenda into European security diplomacy.

Participants discussed subjects including AI-assisted conflict prevention, quantum technologies, cyber risks, digital infrastructure and the security implications of water and energy systems. Organizers also highlighted Geneva’s role as a hub where science and diplomacy intersect, pointing to institutions such as CERN, the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator and the Open Quantum Institute.

Rather than produce binding commitments or formal agreements, the conference amplified the growing concern among diplomats and international organizations that technological acceleration is beginning to outpace the institutions meant to manage geopolitical stability.

For OSCE itself, the meeting also pointed to a broader institutional question: how a security organization created during the Cold War adapts to an environment increasingly shaped not only by military competition and territorial conflict, but by algorithmic systems, cyber operations and technologies developed largely outside traditional state structures.

Cassis argued that multilateral institutions could no longer afford to remain reactive. “Technology will not wait for us. Geopolitics will not slow down,” he said. “If we want to remain relevant, we must anticipate, not react.”